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Abstract
Watsuji is recognised as one Japan’s foremost philosophers. His work on ethics,
Rinrigaku, is cosmopolitan in engaging the Western philosophical tradition, and in
presupposing an international audience. Yet Watsuji’s ethical thought is largely of
niche interest outside Japan, and it is critiqued on the ground that it ratifies totalitari-
anism, demanding individuals’ unquestioning subordination to communal demands.
We offer a reading of Rinrigaku that, in attempting to trace the text’s intention, disputes
these arguments. We argue that Rinrigaku makes individual autonomy central to ethical
action, despite the fact that its treatment of coercion may lead one to think otherwise;
that it does not reduce ethical obligations to whatever demands any given society
imposes on its members; that it draws a distinction between socio-ethical orders that are
genuinely ethical and those that are not; and that, in insisting on the grounding of
individuals in the Absolute, it makes adequate room for individuals’ resistance to
unjustifiable socio-ethical demands.
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1 Introduction
In anticipating communitarianism and post-humanism, Watsuji’s work directly speaks
to contemporary concerns not just in Anglo-American philosophical ethics, but the
humanities more broadly. Yet Watsuji’s influence on Anglo-American ethical thought
remains largely confined to Asianists, and even there the reception of his work has been
mixed at best. Despite fairly recent sympathetic studies by McCarthy (2010, 2011) and
(Japan-based academic) Sevilla (2017), and despite ‘a growing number of translations
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thinker in our problems today’ (Sevilla 2017, p. xxiii), the orthodoxy in Anglo-
American academia is that Watsuji’s work suffers from considerable limitations.
As Odin (1992) summarises it, the main critique – both in Japan and the West – has
argued that Watsuji’s communitarianism ‘has the tendency to slide into an impossible
totalitarianism’ (p. 484), where ‘the individual is submerged in society’ (p. 491). More
specifically, Bernier (2006, p. 89) argues that in Watsuji’s thought ‘the collective is
fundamentally legitimate’; hence, ‘even resistance to a stiffened moral tradition appears
in the final analysis as reprehensible’. Sakai (1991, p. 175) contends that, in arguing
that ethics requires individuals to surrender to the call of totality, ‘Watsuji proposes …
a kind of ethics that permits one to neglect other… ethical concerns in order to remain
on good terms with others’. For Shields (2010, p. 270) it cannot be ruled out that by
‘call of the totality’ Watsuji means an individual’s capitulation to the ‘Emperor/State’.
And Shuttleworth (2019, p. XX) argues that ‘Watsuji … has no concept of individual
choice’, collapsing as he does the opposition between individuals and community until
‘there is no individual who can choose what it authentic, recognizing rather that one is
one’s relations with others’. In this article we offer a critical but sympathetic reading of
the first volume of Watsuji’s work on ethics, Rinrigaku, which disputes these
arguments.
We are not the first to have defended Watsuji from such charges. Johnson (2016, p.
226) notes that Shields (2009) and Lafleur (1978) consider them inconsistent with
Watsuji’s self-conception as a scholar ‘restoring a “middle way” between … atomistic
individualism and … social organicism’, and that Kalmanson (2010) regards them as
oblivious to the Buddhist ‘nondual metaphysics of dependent origination’ at the root of
Watsuji’s thought. Our own strategy in defending Rinrigaku – specifically, its first
volume – takes a different route. It relies on testing different possible readings against
the text as a whole. We hope to show that, although some parts of Rinrigakumay invite
the kind of hermeneutic moves made by Watsuji’s critics, the text as a whole ultimately
remains recalcitrant to them.
In carrying out this critical recuperation of Rinrigaku, it is the text’s own intention
(Eco 1994, pp. 44–63), rather than its author’s, that we will be after (even if we may
often say ‘Watsuji argues…’ or ‘According to Watsuji…’). We follow Gadamer (1975)
in thinking that authorial intention is ultimately irretrievable and, in any case, more of
biographical than hermeneutic interest. Conversely, not only is a text’s intention (or at
least what a text does not intend to say: Eco 1994, pp. 44–63) more amenable to being
grasped; but sometimes readers are also better positioned than the text’s own author to
appreciate the intention of a text.1
Because we are interested in the intention behind the first volume of Rinrigaku, we
do not attempt to read the text in light of Watsuji’s other writings.2 Nor do we attempt
to resolve interpretive questions in light of either the political pressures that, at different
times, may have acted upon Watsuji’s working out of his account of ethics in the
1 Compare Fuller (1940, pp. 8–9), arguing, in the context of legal interpretation, that the objective of a statute
is sometimes more apparent to a reader than its drafter; and Arendt (1982: 61–64) discussing Kant’s argument
that authors and their genius is not prior to audiences and their taste, a faculty that enables them to discriminate
between successful and unsuccessful performances of authorial genius.
2 Bellah (1965) offers an intertextual reading of Rinrigaku and some of Watsuji’s other ethical, as well as
political, writings. Sevilla (2014) discusses how volumes two and three of Rinrigaku (still untranslated)
develop and re-orient Watsuji’s ethical thinking as set out in the first volume.
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different volumes of Rinrigaku (see Sevilla 2014a, pp. 125–126), or the religio-cultural
influences silently informing that account (see Nagami 1981; Lafleur 1978). Conse-
quently, we also do not attempt a reading that balances both of these moves – that is, an
inter-textual and a Buddhism-informed reading – at the same time (for such a reading
see Sevilla 2017, pp. 175–221).
Our argument will be to the effect that Rinrigaku does not sanction totalitarianism,
or demand individuals’ unquestioning subordination to communal demands (section 9).
More specifically, we will argue that Rinrigaku does not reduce morality to whatever
practices and beliefs any given society is committed to (section 2). This is because it
draws a distinction between central (that is, ethically sound) and non-central cases of
socio-ethical orders (section 5). It is also because it insists on the grounding of both
socio-ethical orders and individuals in the Absolute (section 6), which gives individuals
access to objective moral truths, enabling them to resist unjustifiable socio-ethical
demands (sections 7 and 8). We will also argue that Rinrigaku makes individual
autonomy central to ethical action (section 3), despite the fact that its treatment of
coercion may lead one to think otherwise (section 4).
2 Ethics as a Manner of Relational Life
In Rinrigaku Watsuji sets out to clarify the nature of ethics, a problem that he treats as
inextricably linked to ontological questions about the nature of human beings. He
describes rinri (ethics) as ‘a manner of the interconnection of acts that makes ningen
[human beings] truly ningen. That is, it is a manner of sonzai of ningen’; where sonzai
is the condition of existing/persisting in community (Watsuji 1996, pp. 21–22).
As rendered in the translation we are relying on (Yamamoto/Carter), this definition
of ethics as ‘a manner of sonzai’ implies – via the use of the indefinite article ‘a’ – that
human communities can subsist/persist even in non-ethical forms. That is, relational
existence, which is characteristic of human beings, can take different forms: when it
takes the form of rinri (namely, an ethical form), then it is constitutive of the central
case of ‘human being’. In other words, being human, in the best and fullest sense of the
word, means existing within human relations that are structured ethically rather than –
as it is possible – otherwise. This reading rules out that Watsuji subscribes to the view
that ethics can be reduced to whatever practices and beliefs a given society is conven-
tionally committed to: it presupposes that something other than the mere fact of their
social currency is required to qualify any concrete practices and beliefs as authentically
‘ethical’.
However, the Japanese language does not clearly distinguish between definite and
indefinite articles. So, we cannot rest on the word choice of the Yamamoto/Carter’s
translation our case for maintaining that Watsuji does not relativise ethics by reducing it
to the concrete arrangements any given society happens to exist by. Rather, we need to
show that, given the ambiguity in the original, Yamamoto/Carter render Watsuji’s
definition of ethics correctly where they translate that ethics is ‘a’ (that is, one possible)
manner of relational existence. We think that Yamamoto/Carter are indeed correct. We
reach this conclusion through a contextual reading of the more ambiguous definition of
ethics to be found in the original Japanese [「倫理とは人間を人間たらしめる行為的連
関の仕方である。すなわち人間の存在の仕方である。」Our translation: ‘Ethics is a
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mode of interconnection of acts that makes humans human. Therefore, it is about how
humans exist.’ We think this definition of ethics must be contextually understood in
light of other passages of Rinrigaku, which are more explicit in ruling out that ethics
can be reduced to the conventions any society contingently lives by. These passages
will be discussed below. The conclusion we reach conflicts with the view that Watsuji’s
communitarian ethics reflects ‘the general Japanese pattern of Japanese culture itself’
(Odin 1992, p. 492), whereby good and evil are conceived of as a function of ‘the
group as the frame of reference, not as universal principles transcending the group’ (p.
493). Our reading will dispute that Watsuji’s ethical system lacks ‘any universalistic or
transcendental standard relative to which individual and social action can be judged’
(Bellah 1965, p. 589).3
3 Individuality
Watsuji (1996, p. 22) argues that human beings (ningen) have a ‘double structure’ –
individual and social. More specifically, Rinrigaku’s central insight is that individuality
is always contextualised within a web of human relationships (Frattolillo 2004):
individuals and totality come to be established as the negation of each other, and
human beings contain the double structure of individuality/totality.4
Let us turn to how Watsuji (1996, pp. 22–23) himself makes these points:
[T]he standpoint of an acting “individual” comes to be established only in some
way as a negation of the totality of ningen. An individual who does not imply the
meaning of negation, that is, an essentially self-sufficient individual, is nothing
but an imaginative construction. … [But, similarly,] a totality that does not
include the individual negatively is also nothing but a product of the imagination.
These two negations constitute the dual character of a human being. … [W]hen
an individual realizes herself through negation, a door is opened to the realization
of totality through the negation of the individual. The individual’s acting is a
movement of the restoration of totality itself.
Note Watsuji’s (1996) starting point: ‘the standpoint of an acting “individual”’ (p.
22). This emphasis on action is reinforced later: ‘The movement of absolute
negativity is, first of all, a law of human beings… this law is closely tied to the
practical and active spheres of human beings’ (p. 120). This clarifies Watsuji’s
claim that the study of ethics should start with the study of sonzai, relational
existence. An acting individual is a practical agent, that is, one who must decide,
under the circumstances of relational existence, what to do. To be sure, we exist,
and exist as practical agents, not just when we live in community; and not just when
3 Bellah (1965, p. 591) claims that even in its revised version, Rinrigaku andWatsuji’s other post-war writings
‘never’ find ‘another standard of value that can transcend the Emperor’.
4 At the same time, Watsuji makes clear that ‘individual and social modes of existence are abstractions from
the dynamic and concrete reality of human beings in the world’ (Johnson 2016, p. 225). According to Higaki
(2016, p. 461), for Watsuji the ‘isolated individual expresses nothing but a “privation” of the public’, ‘where
the public nature of the self, the relationships that are already involved whenever the self discovers itself, is
“abstracted away”’, leaving … an isolated subjectivity lacking all connection.’
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we are called upon to act in a moral way. But the case of a practical agent sifting
through morally sound and unsound courses of conduct in the context of human
relationships can be justifiably taken as the central (most salient) case of practical
agency. Thus, Watsuji is right in saying that a self-sufficient individual is a
construct of the imagination: such an individual would be one for whom the
question of practical agency does not arise in its central form, that is in the form
of how to conduct oneself morally towards other human beings.
Watsuji (1996, p. 23) clarifies what the movement of double-negation has to do with
ethics:
[T]he true reality of an individual, as well as of totality, is ‘emptiness’ …
[because] ningen’s sonzai is a movement of negation … [T]he basic principle
of social ethics involves two [necessary] moments. One of this is the establish-
ment of the individual as the other, over against totality. What is at stake here is
the taking of a first step toward self-awareness. ... The other moment is the
individual’s surrender to the totality … [T]he totality as community existence
arises at the point where these many individuals become one by forsaking their
individuality.
Sevilla (2014a, p. 112) notes that this account is somewhat puzzling: ‘But what
does this self-awareness actually accomplish? Why take the detour towards indi-
viduality, if only to negate the individual again to realize totality?’ Sevilla (2014a,
p. 105) believes that one should look to the third volume of Rinrigaku to resolve the
ambiguities in the account of double negation contained in the first volume; if we
do so, he argues, we can appreciate that ‘individuality … guides social change by
intuiting how the totality ought to be.’ It is clear, then, that what troubles Sevilla
(2014a) in Rinrigaku’s first volume is that, in insisting that individuality be negated
in the interest of totality, Watsuji backgrounds the question of whether the demands
of totality are justifiable.
Sevilla (2014a) expresses a legitimate concern; but we think we need not look so far
as the third volume of Rinrigaku to address it. Specifically, we think that, in arguing
that ethics demands that the individual, having negated totality, be negated and return to
it, Rinrigaku has in mind not just any society, but the case of ningen sonzai (relational
existence) in which ningen (humans) are truly ningen. This, as we already know, is the
case in which relational existence is structured ethically: that is, the case in which
societal obligations (the demands of totality) are morally justified. If we follow the text
in making this implicit assumption, then it becomes apparent both why individuals,
having negated totality, ought to return to it, and why they ought to have negated it in
the first place. They ought to return to totality because, by definition, doing so means
meeting one’s ethical obligations, and obligations are precisely that – ought-statements.
Yet, before a practical agent’s compliance with (justifiable) societal demands can be
said to be truly ethical, she must have gained awareness of herself as an individual
capable of moral choice. Staying within totality is not enough: If I am to act truly
ethically, I ought to negate totality’s demands (that is question their validity, at least
hypothetically), and then I ought to return to totality. In fact, as we will see below, it is
precisely in this process of double-negation that the individual becomes capable of
assessing whether societal demands are morally justifiable (as they are in the central,
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that is the ethical, case of ningen sonzai), and therefore whether a surrender to totality is
called for.
That is, in the passage just quoted Watsuji is telling us that ethics (the central case of
practical agency) requires, in the first place, individuals to be aware of themselves as
practical agents who could choose to fail to comply with the (legitimate) demands of
community. Then, in the second place, ethics requires them to restore relational
existence by choosing to do the right thing, namely, complying with those demands
(which are by hypothesis justifiable in the context of the central case of ningen sonzai).
In short, ethics demands autonomy: sound ethical prescriptions must be complied
with autonomously, rather than heteronomously (Kant 2009, pp. 50–51). We use this
Kantian terminology loosely, to stress that one’s performance of ethical duty requires
(at least in most cases) that the reason for it be one’s recognition of it as good, rather
than some extraneous (heteronomous) considerations related to the source of the
prescription enjoining the duty (God, society, convention, a figure of authority, State
law, etc). As Raz (1984, p. 141) explains: ‘We expect people to avoid … [misdeeds
such as rape and murder] whether or not they are legally forbidden, and for reasons
which have nothing to do with the law. If it turns out that those reasons fail, that it is
only respect for the law that which restrains them from such acts, then those people lose
much of our respect.’ These observations about legal prescriptions can be extended to
social prescriptions.
We think, therefore, that in stressing that ethics requires not just staying within
community, but gaining consciousness of individuality before returning to commu-
nity via the performance of social obligations, Rinrigaku rightly makes individuals’
moral autonomy central to ethics. Consciousness of individuality enables us to meet
a socio-ethical obligation not unreflectively, just because it is the done thing, but
because we autonomously appreciate and will it as good. The practical conse-
quences of our action may be the same regardless of the reasons we may have for
complying with socio-ethical obligations; but we are not truly acting ethically until
we gain consciousness of ourselves as individuals: free, self-determining agents
capable of moral choice. On this view, the surrender to totality that ethics requires is
the autonomous endorsement of moral norms emerging out of the central case of
ningen sonzai, i.e. genuinely ethical relational existence. To forsake individuality in
the interest of realising totality here is to subordinate self-interest (prudence) to the
imperatives of (sound) morality.
4 Coercion and obligation
The main challenge to this reading of Rinrigaku comes from its treatment of coercion.
As we know, human beings have a negative structure. In this scheme, coercion
suppresses individuality in the interest of the whole. Coercion, specifically, effects
‘the negation of the standpoint of the individual’, and to that extent coercion indeed ‘is
involved’ in the ‘socio-ethical unity’ that results from individuals ‘return[ing] to
themselves through the negation of negation’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 139).
Watsuji (1996, p. 85) endorses Hobbes’ view that ‘coercion is required to ensure that
an individual will obey the laws of society’, because humans naturally ‘rebel against
communal life’. To show that socio-ethical wholes have coercive power, which
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motivates individuals’ compliance with socio-ethical norms, Watsuji (1996, p. 108)
uses the example of a community of love:
love affairs demand exclusive possession … [and this] restricts individuals
through strong coercive power. Therefore, the increase of universalisation and
the strengthening of coercion cannot be separated from one another…We cannot
speak of universalization (and hence, of social forms) without having recourse to
the negation of the individual. (Watsuji 1996, p. 108).
It is apparent that Watsuji here uses ‘coercion’ in a relatively loose sense – one
that he inherited from Durkheim. Coercion, for Durkheim (2013, pp. 20–23), is
characteristic of all social facts – namely, ways of thinking, acting, and feeling
(including those prescribed by laws, customs and morality) that are generalised
throughout a society, exceed the lifespan of any one individual, and impose
themselves on individuals quite regardless of their will. Durkheim equivocates
between the idea of coercion properly-so-called (which implies the use of force
and/or lack of options) and the looser idea of ‘constraint’ (Durkheim 2013, p. 23).
In doing so, he assimilates social penalties (such as criticism or ostracism) that
attend the breach of moral duties, with genuine coercive effects, such as legal
sanctions, or the compulsory use of a country’s language or currency if one wants
to speak or transact there.
To be sure, there is nothing that precludes either Durkheim or Watsuji from
assigning ‘coercion’, by implicit stipulation, such an expanded meaning. But Watsuji
also follows Durkheim (20,134, p. 22) on a more problematic claim: namely, that
because ‘most of our ideas and tendencies … come to us from outside, they can only
penetrate us by imposing themselves upon us’ (emphasis added). This is a non-sequitur,
for I can embrace an idea or moral precept originating outside me, without any form of
imposition. Even if it may be true that much of my ideas were more or less ‘imposed’
on me through education in childhood (Durkheim 2013, p. 23), insisting on the idea of
‘imposition’ obscures the fact that Socratic self-examination is not thereby precluded to
me. Durkheim himself recognises this in his later work on moral education (see Smith
2014, p. 23, 26, 28).
Watsuji’s treatment of coercion reflects some of these ambiguities in Durkheim’s
work. This, we think, explains why in the passage quoted above, about the coercive
power of love affairs, Watsuji (1996, p. 108) establishes an equivalence between
coercion and the negation of individuality that results in norm-compliance. Indeed,
later Watsuji (1996, p. 139) performs a wholesale rhetorical conflation of obligation
and coercion: ‘[C]oercion constitutes the essence of obligation.… [O]bligation requires
self-negation with an imperative authority, and the thus negated individual obeys this
authority out of respect’ (p. 139).5
However, Watsuji must have known – as Durkheim himself realised (Smith 2014,
p. 23, 26, 28) – that individuals do not comply with communal demands only when
5 This passage strikes us as self-refuting. It is unclear, specifically, that the point that ‘coercion constitutes the
essence of obligation’ sits well with the point that ‘the negated individual obeys this authority out of respect’;
indeed, if coercion is the essence of obligation, we would rather expect the individual to obey out of fear of
sanctions.
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they are made to (via coercion), or out of fear of sanctions (that, is because of the
threat of coercion): just as often they comply because they think it is the right thing to
do. The very example of love affairs, used by Watsuji to illustrate the centrality of
coercion in realising totality, actually proves that coercion is merely incidental to this
realisation. For one could not truly participate in the distinctive good that is a
monogamous love affair, if the only or main reason for one’s fidelity to one’s lover
were a heteronomous one based in coercion or the threat thereof. Thus, we think that
Rinrigaku’s points about coercion – if we are to make good sense out of them –must
be understood to mean that coercion is required only to the extent that individuals fail
autonomously to return to community (that is, willingly and non-heteronomously to
comply with community’s legitimate demands). If one is to salvage the ethical picture
drawn by Rinrigaku, then this implicit qualification must be built into its account of
coercion.
What led Watsuji astray here was his determination to conceptualise coercion and
individuality as co-implying each other. We already know that for Watsuji we are
individuals only insofar as we either eschew, or contemplate eschewing,6 the demands
of socio-ethical obligation. Watsuji’s treatment of coercion makes the mistake of
thinking that when we voluntarily comply with such obligations, we lose consciousness
of our individuality – a consciousness that, on the other hand, coercion preserves.
Watsuji (1996, p. 114) illustrates this by analogy:
people who engage in a communal rope pull with sincerity combine to become
one subject. It is not that I pull and that you also pull but that “one power”
somehow pulls. On the other hand, “coercion” consists of forcing separated
individual subjects to subordinate themselves to the whole.
So, for Watsuji (1996, p. 116) individual revolt and societal coercion are the forcible/
violent movements that co-imply each other and that explain the negative structure of
human beings: only when I am made to obey do I realise totality without losing my
individuality (this is because coercion, being involuntary, does not affect consciousness
of my independence).7 This point, too, smacks a little of Durkheim – particularly his
idea that ‘conforming to the normal order of things because one is … sure … that
everything is as it ought to be’ does not qualify as a genuine moral act, for that kind of
conformity does not involve ‘submitting to a constraint’ (Smith 2014, p.28). Watsuji
may have been misled by this point into thinking that it is only if I feel compelled
against my will that I can experience myself as an individual (a practical agent capable
of autonomous choice); hence only under such coercive circumstances does my
conformity have a moral quality.
To take stock: in Rinrigaku’s account, individuality consists in the conscious-
ness of one’s self-interest as in opposition to socio-ethical obligations; only
6 It is not necessary for individuals to actually revolt and be forced back into association. It is enough to have
the consciousness of revolt, so that coercion can also work as the threat of coercion, as is clear from Watsuji’s
(1996, p. 115) discussion of the power of love in romantic relationships.
7 This is also clear from how Watsuji (1996, p. 110) approvingly discusses Durkheim, who ‘emphasized that
society stands as the other to individual consciousness’, and who criticised the sociological ‘viewpoint that
tries to deal with society, [rather than in terms of coercion,] as reciprocal mental activities’, a viewpoint whose
tendency is to dissolve ‘individual consciousness … in society.’
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through ‘revolting against the whole … does the consciousness of the ego come to
be established’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 134). One’s performance of obligation can take
two forms under this scheme: either one complies because one is made to,
coerced, so that one’s compliance is not truly consensual, and it is in that tension
that one’s consciousness of individuality is maintained; or one complies because
one sincerely wants to (as in the rope pull example), but then it is not really one
who is acting, but the whole, in which one has already lost one’s individuality. It
is apparent that this conceptual economy makes difficult to accommodate precise-
ly the individual’s non-heteronomous endorsement of socio-ethical obligation that
we have discussed in the previous section.
Yet, pace Rinrigaku’s treatment of coercion, the central case of negation of individ-
uality should be seen precisely as the individual autonomously deciding to subordinate
her self-interest to the common good, either because this is a requirement of justice (in
which case the individual negates unjustifiable individualistic impulses or desires), or
as a matter of supererogation, that is, as a way of going beyond the call of duty (in
which case the individual willingly negates her self-interest despite the fact that society
cannot rightly demand it of her). Coercion only comes into play when autonomous
performance of duty does not.
There are, happily, moments in which Rinrigaku explicitly recognises precisely
something along these lines, abandoning its view that individuality and coercion
co-imply each other. This is especially apparent where Watsuji (1996, p. 138)
shows how the concept of freedom is nothing other than ‘the fundamental law of a
human being’ described by the movement of negation. On the one hand, the
freedom-from that preoccupies liberal political philosophers describes the first
movement of negation, which consists in an individual emancipating herself from
society; on the other hand, the idea of freedom as self-causation, as autonomous
self-determination à la Kant (‘according to Kant’s explanation, this autonomy
consists of the control of the individual self by the superindividual and authentic
self’) describes the return to the whole.
This passage cannot be reconciled with a view that takes at face value Watsuji’s
claims about the co-implication of coercion and individuality. Rather, it implicitly
qualifies those claims, making room for a return totality that proceeds from one’s
moral autonomy rather than from coercion. Indeed, in admitting that the autono-
mous performance of moral duty qualifies as the negation of negation that restores
the totality of ningen in the distinctly ethical way – that is, by retaining ningen’s
double structure – this passage implicitly denies what Watsuji (1996, p. 114) had
tried to establish with the rope pull example: namely, that voluntariness in the
performance of duty results in the dissolution of one’s individuality into the
whole. It is with good reason, that Watsuji (1996, 138) now implicitly recants
that point. While pulling a rope with sincerity, I may know very well, for example,
that I will choose to assert my individual will against peer pressure and choose not
to partake in the next game; by the same token, when I autonomously perform a
socio-ethical obligation, the only thing that dissolves is my resistance to the
performance of that particular obligation, but that resistance is not all that the
consciousness of my individuality consists in. In short, in the passage where it
discusses freedom-from and freedom as self-causation (Watsuji 1996, p. 138),
Rinrigaku implicitly concedes that consciousness of individuality fails us no more
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when we autonomously perform socio-ethical obligations than when we are
coerced into them.8
Likewise, Watsuji’s (1996, p. 135) critique of the crowd instinct is clearly
predicated upon the possibility of a kind of conformity with norms that is neither
coerced, nor like his example of the rope pull (where individuality, supposedly,
disappears). This kind of norm-conformity results from individuals autonomously
choosing to be community-oriented and to comply with socio-ethical obligations
when confronted with the possibility to revolt against such obligations out of
egotism. Specifically, Watsuji (1996, p. 135) is clear that unthinking or mechan-
ical conformity to socio-ethical demands is not praiseworthy: although it makes
‘existence of society as an organic whole’ arise, it is at the cost of individuals
losing their ‘self-conscious essence’ and spending ‘hours in idle slumber in a
community, falling victim to the “crowd”’. The logical alternative to such forms
of social conformity is, clearly, just that non-heteronomous performance of socio-
ethical duty that elsewhere Watsuji’s preoccupation with coercion tends to
obscure.
5 Between Conventionalism and Objectivism
In the previous sections we have already sketched the thrust of our argument about
how Rinrigaku should be read: the movement of double negation draws attention
to the fact that personal autonomy is key to genuinely ethical action. It is not just
that awareness of one’s individuality ‘is a paradigmatically ethical moment,
insofar as a weak sense of self as individual puts one in danger of everything
from falling into the mindless conventionality of the crowd to developing a
willingness to submit to powerful external forces’ (Johnson 2016, p. 226). Rather,
even when the demands of totality are morally justifiable, a weak sense of self
partly evacuates the performance of ethical obligations of its ethical value: for
conduct to be truly ethical, we must gain awareness of ourselves as self-
determining subjects, even if only to then put our self-determination in the service
of community-oriented social obligations that codify sound ethical imperatives.
This reading is contingent on assuming that wherever Rinrigaku states that ethics
means surrendering to the call of totality, it is assuming a surrender to the central case
of ningen sonzai, that is, a community whose demands on its members are morally
sound. Is that assumption justified, though? Or does Rinrigaku’s account, rather, end up
automatically ratifying as ethical everything that any given community may happen to
demand of its members at any particular time (as long as individuals autonomously
endorse those demands)?
8 Later, in discussing goodness and badness, Watsuji (1996, p. 284) argues that the revolt against wholeness is
not actually bad if ‘the self and other opposed to each other in individualization, are already anticipating the
unity of the future in and through this present opposition … [so that individualization is already] pierced
through with the moment of coming back’. Similarly, then, when autonomous compliance with socio-ethical
obligations might appear to dissolve the individual in the whole, we should instead recognise that compliance
is pierced through with the possibility of future revolt, enabling consciousness of individuality to persist in
compliance.
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The question arises because there are many ambiguous statements in Rinrigaku,
which are compatible with either view on ethics. We have already drawn attention
to a passage (Watsuji 1996, p. 22) that – depending on how one construes the
ambiguity generated by the lack of distinction between definite and indefinite
articles in Japanese – can be read as either implicitly affirming or denying that
communal life can ever take unethical forms. Similarly, several other passages are
compatible with either an objectivist or a conventionalist conception of ethics.
Take the following: ‘If I perform some obligation I am not actually obedient to
an obligation that I myself set forth but to the social order I have inherited from
being taught, and such order is thought to be objectively grounded in law and
morality’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 111). The expression ‘objectively grounded in …
morality’ may suggest an objectivist stance on morality, which sees the latter as a
matter of moral facts or truths. But Watsuji’s bringing law into it – given that we
are all familiar with the existence of bad laws – muddles the waters. It may
suggest, specifically, that morality here is treated as objective only in the same
way in which law is. That is, what the word ‘objectively’ might imply is that
morality (like law) can be objectively ascertained by looking at a community’s
social practices and/or beliefs (this is a conventionalist understanding of ethics);
not that morality is an objective fact potentially in conflict with those practices
and beliefs (this is an objectivist understanding of ethics).
Likewise, Watsuji’s (1996, p. 134) point that goodness ‘may also be achieved by
recognizing another community’, rather than by going back to the socio-ethical whole
one has revolted against, could also be interpreted in either a conventionalist or
objectivist sense. The conventionalist interpretation is that the content of one’s obliga-
tions (as determined by different communities’ practices) does not matter, as long as
one obeys a community’s obligations. The objectivist interpretation is that revolt
against one’s socio-ethical order may lead us towards other, more genuinely ethical,
socio-ethical wholes (compare Sevilla 2014a, p. 113).
When Rinrigaku’s discussion starts to foreground the Absolute, however, these
interpretive ambiguities can be dispelled. We already know that it only makes
sense to speak of ethics where revolt against the socio-ethical whole (or totality) is
either contemplated or enacted; and where conformity with duty occurs by way of
further negation (Watsuji 1996, p. 121) – either through (threat of) coercion that
motivates compliance, or the autonomous endorsement of socio-ethical obliga-
tions. Because what makes ningen truly ningen is relational existence structured
by ethical norms (Watsuji 1996, p. 22), and because ethics is the movement of
double negation, ‘the true reality of an individual, as well as of totality, is
“emptiness”’ (p. 23), that is, ‘absolute negativity’, which Watsuji says is the
‘fundamental source’ of individuals (p. 117).9 For both individuals and the
concrete socio-ethical wholes to emerge as finite, individuated entities out of the
Absolute/absolute negativity, their ultimate essence as emptiness or absolute
negativity must be negated (Watsuji 1996, p. 120). In practice, however, it is by
9 This part of Watsuji’s thought is rooted in Buddhism (Bellah 1965, p. 584; Lafleur 1978; Nagami 1981;
Sevilla 2017).
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opposing each other – rather than, strictly speaking, the Absolute/absolute nega-
tivity itself – that individuals and socio-ethical wholes establish their being10:
The negation of absolute negativity [that] establishes the standpoint of an indi-
vidual … always takes place in the form of a revolt against the whole as
something socio-ethical … Similarly, the standpoint of the whole is established
as the negation of negation of absolute negativity ... But this should not be taken
to signify a mystical experience in which the individual is immersed in the
Absolute. The sublation ... of the individual’s independence that arises as the
negation of negation occurs in the form of its subordination to the socio-ethical
whole … which appears in various forms, such as family, friends, a company, a
state, and so forth. ... [R]egarding this union of an individual with the whole,
mention can be made of a superindividual will, or the total will, or of obligatory
acts and so forth (Watsuji, 196, pp. 120-121, emphasis added).
Of course, there is nothing that guarantees that finite socio-ethical wholes individuate
themselves out of the Absolute in ethically sound forms: socio-ethical obligations, as
defined by the finite socio-ethical whole’s superindividual will, may or may not impose
justifiable demands on individuals. Yet participation of individuals in the Absolute, and
hence in authentic justice, can only occur via their relationship with the finite socio-
ethical wholes against which they revolt, and to which they return. That is, concrete,
finite socio-ethical orders are the places where justice is enacted and aspired to.
Authentic justice will not be fully realisable within these orders, given their finitude;
and yet they are the only places where striving towards authentic justice can occur. As
Watsuji (1996, p. 122) explains, universal brotherhood is ‘“an ideal”, not a socio-ethical
reality’, and yet this does not make it ‘simply nonsense.‘ If we were to try to realise it,
‘from where else should we start other than from just now? Unless we recognize that the
finite socio-ethical whole is precisely the place of the self-return of the Absolute, then
this ideal would, in the final analysis, fall victim to the charge of meaninglessness’.
So, in appealing to the Absolute, Watsuji’s account conjures up a disjunction
between conventional morals (a concrete community’s practices and or beliefs) and
the demands of authentic justice (the standard against which those practices and beliefs
are to be judged). At the same time he insists that it is only within concrete socio-ethical
wholes that the aspiration towards justice can be worked out and (partially) realised.
This point comes across particularly clearly when Watsuji (1996, pp. 122–123)
discusses Buddha and Christ, who, in revolting against the socio-ethical whole,
managed what is not possible for the rest of us, that is, to stand in a genuinely
direct relationship to the Absolute (as opposed to experiencing it as mediated by
the socio-ethical forms of the community). Yet, as Watsuji is keen to point out,
these figures later went back to their community to realise moral precepts within
the finite socio-ethical whole.
10 At the same time the mutual negation of individuals and socio-ethical wholes gestures towards their
common ground, for to ‘think of a thing is to distinguish it from something else, and yet in order to make
such a distinction, the two must already have had something in common’ (Carter and McCarthy 2019). That
common ground is precisely absolute negativity – the emptying of individuals and socio-ethical wholes into
the Absolute, or ‘that totality beyond all limited, social totalities, namely the emptiness or nothingness at the
bottom of all things’ (Carter and McCarthy 2019).
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Here Watsuji’s account draws a distinction between socio-ethical orders as they are
and as they ought to be. The problem is that, unlike Buddha and Christ, we cannot
judge socio-ethical wholes by standing outside them, in a position that gives us direct,
unmediated access to the Absolute and authentic justice. A society in which ‘each
individual is tied to the Absolute’ –Watsuji (1996: p.121) calls it an ‘open society’ – is
an abstraction: it would not be a human society in the first place, it would be something
that subsists in a form other than sonzai. Yet, despite this lack of direct access to the
Absolute, Rinrigaku wants to make room for our ability to grasp ethics in a way other
than one based purely on conventionalism.
This ability is clearly presupposed where Watsuji (1996, p. 189) speaks of individ-
uals discarding socio-ethical wholes only to find that the authentic socio-ethical whole
is thereby foregrounded. An even clearer stance against pure conventionalism is
apparent where he discusses closed societies. These are just the communities or
socio-ethical wholes we are all familiar with: they are characterised by non-universal
(i.e. exclusive) membership,11 and by the fact that they demand conformity to their
practices/conventions/laws (Watsuji, 121–123). Crucially, Watsuji (1996, p. 123)
warns us against treating our communities, that is closed societies, as ‘an ultimate aim’:
A family or a state, as instances of socio-ethical wholes, has the authority to
demand obedience from individuals, but this demand cannot be authorized
merely from the standpoint of a family or a state. Where an individual who
revolted against a family or a state, finds himself based in the Absolute, then by
what right can a family or a state, as finite wholes, demand the negation of this
individual? Even the prosperity of a state, insofar as this state is but a finite group
of human beings, is not given priority over the dignity of an individual who
originates in the Absolute.
We do not think there is a way of making sense of this passage that can dispense
with the idea that the authority of socio-ethical wholes ultimately depends on the
extent to which their demands are objectively justifiable. If our complying with
their authoritative directives is likely to improve conformity with reasons that apply
to us (reasons being facts about what is of value in the world), then those directives
have legitimate authority over us, but not otherwise (Raz 2006).12 The question
then is how we can make reliable judgements about situations in which non-
compliance with societal demands is called for, because those demands are not
justifiable in ethical (or other) terms. Though we cannot have direct access to the
Absolute, we are ‘based’ and ‘originate’ in it (Watsuji 1996, p. 23), and it seems
that it is precisely the movement of negation – when we take it upon ourselves to
question our finite socio-ethical wholes, as a prelude to returning to them – that
activates that origin or grounding in the Absolute, affording us insight into objec-
tive values, including moral facts, and enabling reasoned resistance against societal
demands that violate those moral facts.
11 Recall that universal brotherhood is purely an ideal and an abstraction.
12 While Bernier (2006, p. 89) may be right in arguing that ‘instances of justified revolt are peripheral in
[Watsuji’s] analysis’, it seems to us that we should not try to explain them away: doing so would not do justice
to the text’s intention – or that is what this paper hopes to show.
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Rinrigaku’s treatment of evil, too, suggests its allegiance to a non-conventionalist
understanding of ethics. Its description of ‘badness’ as the ‘movement’ of ‘rebellion’
against ‘one community or another’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 133) might lead one to think
otherwise; but, as an illustration, Watsuji (1996, pp. 133–134) states that in all religions
as well as, before them, in ‘tribal societies’, ‘the separation from the whole due to
hatred or egoism has been proclaimed “evil”’. The qualification ‘due to hatred or
egoism’ appeals to objective standards that would have been omitted if it were merely
the fact of revolt against the whole in and of itself that were crucial to something
qualifying as evil. The same is true of the qualifier ‘authentic’, in the statement that the
‘standpoint of the “self” is that of the opposition between self and other that has
departed from authentic wholeness’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 189).
6 Knowing Moral Truth
We have argued that, although we cannot have direct access to the Absolute, we are
always grounded in it, and it is precisely the movement of negation – the point at which
one questions one’s socio-ethical obligations – that affords us insight into moral facts.
Watsuji’s discussion of the Kantian requirement of norm universalizability confirms
this reading.
The judgement that one’s action, as mandated by a socio-ethical obligation, con-
forms with a universalisable prescription, out of which ‘the imperative to act arises’,
implies a ‘superdiscriminative, authentic self as noumenon’: this is a ‘supraindividual
rational will that lies at the rear of the individual will’ that has revolted against the
obligation (Watsuji 1996, p. 139). That finite, individual will has emerged precisely ‘in
separation from [that] superindividual, superdiscriminative foundation’; as a result of
that separation, ‘congruence with the universal is again demanded’ through an individ-
ual’s return to ‘the superdiscriminative as its ground’ (p. 139). We have seen, however,
that, according to Rinrigaku, participation of the individual in the Absolute, and hence
in the superdiscriminative, can only occur via their relationship with the finite socio-
ethical whole. So, genuinely ethical actions occur – where they do – precisely in the
form of a movement of revolt against (in the sense of questioning of) and a (discerning)
return to the demands of the finite socio-ethical whole. More concretely, access to
moral truth requires critical engagement with a communal context and its concrete
prescriptions. This makes intuitive sense, if only because of the communal character of
the good of knowledge (including knowledge of moral facts).
Watsuji (1996, p. 245) offers examples of this dependence of objective moral
judgements on social forms: ‘Whereas Kant took for granted the presupposition
that not to gain excessive profits is to act in accordance with one’s obligation or
that one is obliged to sell goods honestly, nevertheless, the problem of what
constitutes excessive profits or honesty can be resolved only socially’. Kant’s
examples of the duty to preserve one’s life and to show benevolence towards the
less fortunate are also found, by Watsuji (1996, p. 246), to be not self-standing (as
Kant implies), but dependent on the social: ‘In one’s being, one has a position that
is determined by various forms of the whole’ and it is due to this socially
determined position that the obligation to preserve one’s life ‘matter[s] at all to
ethics’. Likewise, ‘benevolence’ is a duty only in societies where inequalities of
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power and wealth exist: where equal status is enjoyed, one would ‘think it
shameful to be shown mercy’ (p. 247).
Note that these passages do not propose a conventionalist account of morality,
whereby the badness or goodness of something is reducible to a function of the
conventions of any given socio-ethical whole. It is no doubt true that honest selling
and excessive profits only make sense in the context of human practices such as
business, and that these practices, and the prescriptions that go with them, vary
(Watsuji 1996, p. 246). But the requirements of honesty or avoidance of greed in
business are based on more general principles/virtues that exceed the business context
and thereby manifest themselves in social spheres different from business (indeed, they
would manifest themselves even in societies where business did not exist). As to the
duty to show benevolence and the duty to preserve one’s life, it might or might not be
right that they are socially contingent in the way Rinrigaku claims they are. But, either
way, the good of life or value of sympathy are not themselves so contingent; so, a shift
in communal practices would not change the objectivity of those values, thought it
might change the content and significance of the duties derived from them. So, the
dependence of moral judgements on the particular social forms of finite and concrete
socio-ethical wholes does not mean that moral facts themselves are also so dependent.
To put it differently, it is not justifiable to draw, from Rinrigaku’s emphasis on the
contingency of the validity of specific socio-ethical obligations, the conclusion that the
values that underlie those obligations (moral facts) are themselves contingent.
What Rinrigaku does insist on, is that we only come to know of those moral facts by
interrogating the concrete socio-ethical obligations associated with them in the context
of the social forms of finite socio-ethical wholes, not by harnessing anything like pure
reason. Watsuji (1996, p. 252) is clear on this: he argues that Kant is right in taking as
determinative of what counts as genuinely ethical conduct the congruence between ‘the
subjective principle determining the individual will (i.e., the maxim) and the objective
one (i.e. the moral law)’ – for after all ‘[t]his correspondence is what we had in mind by
means of what I term the individual/total basic structure of ningen sonzai’. Nonetheless,
he notes, the moral law itself is not grounded purely in logic or pure reason, almost as if
the requirement of universalisation, coupled with appeal to some purportedly a-priori
considerations, is enough to allow us to determine on the permissibility/obligatoriness
of a course of conduct. Rather, the moral law is something we can only figure out ‘from
the standpoint of human relationships’, from ‘the spatio-temporal dynamic structure if
ningen sonzai’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 250). There are, here, echoes of Rawls (1971, p. 587),
where he describes what he calls the ‘standpoint of eternity’ as ‘not a perspective from a
certain place beyond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being’, but ‘a
form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the world’. But
Watsuji emphasises the communal nature of that world, reminding us that the enablijg
condition for the very rationality of rational persons is the self’s embeddedness in the
socio-ethical whole.
7 An Objectivist Perspective on Moral Facts
We argued that although socio-ethical obligations and their validity are contingent on the
social forms of finite socio-ethical wholes, the moral facts on which they are based are
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not. Rinrigaku is explicit about this when discussing trust and truth(fulness). Watsuji
(1996, pp. 265–282) argues these are necessary to ningen sonzai: authentic wholeness
requires and presupposes trust and truth, and so do the concrete communities that do
more or less of a good job of instantiating authentic wholeness. Indeed, ‘human relation-
ships are those of trust’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 271) and ‘at a place where truthfulness does not
occur at all, ningen sonzai perishes … [T]he fixation of evil, radical evil, consists
precisely in preventing the truthfulness of ningen sonzai from occurring’ (p. 282).
Like his discussion of the Absolute, Watsuji’s remarks about truthfulness and trust
are an important counterpoint to the passages in Rinrigaku that could be interpreted as
supporting a conventionalist stance on morality. In fact, not only truthfulness and trust,
but also certain duties grounded in them are inseparable from ningen sonzai, and as
such could be said to qualify as objective moral facts applicable across time and space.
Watsuji (1996, p. 287) mentions the prohibitions against homicide, adultery, theft and
deceit, shared by the Five Commandments of Buddhism and the Ten Commandments
of Christianity. These acts involve a betrayal of trust and hence a revolt against
truthfulness: as such their wrongness can be determined ‘on the basis of ningen sonzai
and therefore remains constant, in any time or place’ (p. 287). This is perhaps the single
most objectivist statement in Rinrigaku.
Yet, the import of this statement is almost negated by the way in which Watsuji
responds to the objection that different societies have widely different practices in
respect of homicide, adultery, theft and deceit. Watsuji concedes this, but explains that
the prohibitions remain constant: it is their scope of application that varies depending
on how encompassing the relationships of trust are in any given society. So, homicide
is always considered wrong, but killing an enemy or the sacrifice of a designated victim
do not count as homicide in societies that condone these practices because there is no
relationship of trust between the victim and the executioner, and hence no shared
expectation that the duty will be complied with in relation to victims. Similarly, if in
heroic societies the powerful are allowed to plunder, that is because plunder does not
really count as theft, as the weak do not trust the powerful will abstain from appropri-
ating the spoils of those they defeat. On the other hand, Christianity preaches universal
brotherhood, and extends trust to all human beings, thus making all human killing
count as homicide; and Buddhism extends trust to all living things, so animal killing
counts as homicide, too (Watsuji 1996, pp. 88–291). Watsuji (1996, p. 291) concludes
that, therefore, ‘the view that the standard of goodness and badness differs in accor-
dance with time and place is obviously false. What differs here has something to do
with the extent of the trust relationship and the manner of its expression, not with the
principle according to which a response of trust is good and a betrayal of trust bad’.
A moral objectivist reading this passage might well conclude that Rinrigaku’s own
moral objectivism is hollow, if, together with the (constant) moral wrongness of theft,
homicide, etc., it accepts at face value the ways in which different communities have
historically confined and continue to confine the benefits of prohibitions against theft
and homicide on morally arbitrary grounds. Sakai (1991, pp. 183–185) is right, here, in
critiquing the conception of trust that seems to emerge from passages of Rinrigaku such
as this. As he argues, sociality is not just the ability to ‘operate within pre-arranged social
relations, such as parent-child and employer-employee. Sociality… mean[s] the ability
to leave behind the sort of trust warranted by the already existing relations, to “go out
into the world” and to establish new relations with strangers’ (Sakai 1991, p. 184).
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Yet we should not necessarily assume Watsuji would disagree. In discussing theft,
homicide, adultery and deceit, Watsuji may not expressly point out that relationships of
trust have been historically confined by many societies on morally arbitrary grounds.
But just because he does not say so, does not mean he does not believe it. After all,
recall his statement that if universal brotherhood is ‘an ideal’, it is not thereby ‘simply
nonsense‘(Watsuji 1996, p. 122).
8 The Call of Totality
We are now in a position to address the problem we started with: does Rinrigaku ratify
an ethical vision in which individuals are wholly subordinated to the totality, in the
contingent forms in which any given socio-ethical whole instantiates it? Consider
statements such as: ‘The supreme value is absolute wholeness; and an aspiration, or
upward drive, or eagerness for it, is “goodness”’ (Watsuji 1996, p. 134); and ‘Con-
science is the call of the original totality;… good and evil consist respectively in going
back into and going against the direction of this movement’ (p. 23). Do not these
passages betray a kind of communitarian ethics where the individual and her rights
count for precisely nothing?
We think Rinrigaku does not authorise us to draw such conclusions from these
statements. For all that we can only experience the Absolute in the context of concrete
socio-ethical wholes, absolute wholeness and original totality are clearly attributes of
the Absolute, not of concrete socio-ethical wholes. Thus, re-establishing absolute
wholeness or heeding the call of the original totality may or may not involve subordi-
nation to the demands of the concrete socio-ethical whole against which we revolted –
it depends on how those demands measure up. In light of Watsuji’s (1996, p. 123)
argument about the dignity of individuals grounded in the Absolute, Rinrigaku’s moral
objectivism, and the room it makes for our knowledge of moral truth, we think it is an
interpretive mistake to read passages such as these as requiring individuals to make
endless concessions to the community. Rather, Rinrigaku is consistent with the view
that wholeness is genuinely realised only where everyone is given their due, and when
acts of self-sacrifice that go beyond the call of duty are recognised as supererogatory,
rather than obligatory.
9 Conclusions
We have proposed a critical recuperation of Rinrigaku in response to arguments that
Watsuji’s communitarian ethics conflates the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ of morality, and that it has
a troubling anti-individualistic bias. The key original insight of Rinrigaku is that ethics
is a movement of double-negation. When properly understood, this insight makes
individual moral agency central to ethical action, by insisting that to truly qualify as
ethical, compliance with a socio-ethical obligation requires the agent to non-
heteronomously endorse the obligation. Coming to this conclusion requires reading
the parts of Rinrigaku that deal with coercion against the grain – but there is enough in
the rest of the text to justify such a hermeneutic move. Rinrigaku also makes due
allowance for individuals resisting the unjustifiable demands of socio-ethical wholes:
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although it is committed to a non-transcendent understanding of ethics, it does not
thereby fall into the trap of treating moral values as a function of societies’ contingent
practices. It is precisely in the iterations of the movement of double-negation that
individuals can access moral truth, and hence either non-heteronomously comply with
socio-ethical demands, or resist them on the ground that, albeit socio-ethical, they are
not genuinely ethical.
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